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5Introduction
Hungary’s history can be traced back to
the late ninth century AD when the Magyars
abandoned their nomadic lifestyle to settle near
the Carpathian Mountains. Under the rule of
the Árpáds, the Magyars became a powerful
dynasty in Europe. However, following the
death of King Stephen I (997–1038), the fifth
generation of the dynasty, the Árpáds slowly lost
their influence. Hungary was subsequently con-
quered by the Mongols, then the Ottomon
Turks, and finally the Austrian Habsburgs. In
1848 Hungarian nationalists attempted a revo-
lution (“Hungary”), demanding autonomy after
living under the governance of these foreign
powers. The revolution failed, but a compro-
mise between Austria and Hungary was even-
tually struck in 1867. Under the compromise,
a dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary was estab-
lished. (“Important Dates…”) This arrangement
limited Austria’s control over Hungary’s inter-
nal affairs, enabling Hungary to enjoy real inde-
pendence and self-governance for the first time
since the Turkish invasion in the fourteenth
century. However, due to the Austrian-
Hungarian relationship, Hungary was inevitably
plunged into World War I when Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian
throne, was assassinated in Sarajevo on June
28, 1914. (Duffy)
Hungary lost huge amounts of her land
and people as a result of losing World War I.
These losses crippled Hungary’s economy and
created new political tensions between Hungary
and her neighbors. The country had barely
recovered from the first war when the second
one struck. At the end of World War II, both the
retreating Germans and the invading Soviet
armies stripped Hungary of what little wealth
it had left.
This article examines how Hungary’s
defeat in the twentieth century’s two world wars
led to the emergence of the problem of
Hungarians outside Hungary’s borders, a prob-
lem that continues to plague Hungary today. It
then explores the efforts by different parties to
re-incorporate these countrymen into the fold.
The final section discusses various solutions
that have been proposed to address this issue
and examines the future status of the problem.
The Treaty of Trianon (1920)
The conclusion of World War I left
Hungary in serious economic and political tur-
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moil. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire in October 1918 hurled Hungary into
what was probably the most politically unsta-
ble period in her history. From 1918 to 1920,
the country went through a democratic revo-
lution, a communist revolution, the Romanian
occupation of Budapest, and the occupation of
various parts of the country by neighboring
armies. Four types of government systems were
also tried, along with eight cabinets and two
rival governments. The political instability con-
cluded with the Treaty of Trianon on June 4,
1920, imposed on Hungary as a defeated nation
in the war. (Szarka, pp. 30–31)
The Treaty was one of the five treaties pre-
pared at the Paris Peace Conference, an inter-
national conference created by the Allies to
negotiate peace treaties with the defeated
Central Powers. (“Paris Peace Conference”) As
stipulated in Clause II, Articles 27–35 of the
Treaty, Hungary lost two-thirds of her territo-
ry, mainly to Romania, Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia. (Pastor, p. 165) Figure 1 shows the
extent of Hungary’s dismemberment caused by
the Treaty. This re-drawing of borders caused
Hungary to lose 3.4 million inhabitants, which
amounted to a third of her population. (Vigh)
Along with the loss of population came the loss
of 61 percent of her arable land, 88 percent of
her timber, 62 percent of her railroads, and
Hungary’s access to the sea through Croatia.
Additionally, Hungary’s army was limited to
35,000 men, whose role was restricted to main-
taining domestic order and border defense.
(“Hungary”) The winners of the war clearly took
full advantage of their victory. Almost all of the
new country of Czechoslovakia was carved out
of former Hungarian territory. Romania alone
received land compensation that was larger
than what was left of Hungary. (Imre) Hungary
was the most severely penalized country among
all the defeated nations of the war. For exam-
ple, Turkey was able to retain most of her
empire, losing only outlying portions. Bulgaria
lost only 8 percent of her land, while Germany
lost 13 percent. Oddly enough, Austria, which
was also one of the losers, ended up gaining
parts of Hungary. (Imre)
The severe territorial loss suffered by
Hungary was mainly caused by political inter-
ests. The Allies, particularly France, needed new
allies in the East to curb the growing threat of
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Figure 1
Hungary Before and After The Treaty of Trianon
Source: Binnendijk and Simon.
Russia’s Bolshevism. Czechoslovakia, known for
its anti-Bolshevik stance, took the opportunity
to demand more land as compensation.
Similarly, Romania, which was expected to fol-
low Czechoslovakia’s role in helping to resist
Russia, also took advantage of the situation to
demand more territorial compensation. (Ádám,
p. 18) Since both Czechoslovakia and Romania
were strategically situated in the event of any
Russian advance, their territorial claims were
given special consideration by the Paris Peace
Conference at the expense of Hungary.
Hungary’s large territorial loss was also
caused by the lack of communication among
the three committees set up by the Paris Peace
Conference to resolve border issues in
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and
Yugoslavia. (Ádám, p. 19) As Ádám points out
in his article “Delusions about Trianon,” the
committees were each assigned different sec-
tions of Hungarian frontiers to deal with. Each
committee, working independently, recom-
mended that small parts of Hungary be given
to the victors in the war. Although individual-
ly each seemed to be a reasonable price for
Hungary to pay for its defeat, the three areas in
the end amounted to two-thirds of Hungary’s
territory.
Not surprisingly, the Treaty of Trianon was
received with much hostility by the
Hungarians. The border revision determined by
the Treaty was deemed unjust because
Hungarians did not feel adequately represent-
ed in the Peace Conference. It was true that the
committee members were social and econom-
ic experts on the region, but they consisted only
of Czechoslovakians, Romanians and Yugoslavs.
(Ádám, p. 19) In fact, Ádám argues that the
acknowledged expertise of the committee mem-
bers might have hurt, rather than helped, the
Hungarians, because as experts the recom-
mendations of the committee were never ques-
tioned by the Peace Conference.
In addition, the Treaty of Trianon was
denounced by Hungarians because it placed
millions of Hungarians outside Hungary. There
were now approximately two million
Hungarians in Transylvanian Romania, 600,000
in Slovakia, 400,000 in Vojvodina Serbia and
200,000 in Ukraine. (Binnendijk and Simon)
According to the new demarcation lines, at one
stroke Hungarians became the largest minori-
ty group in Europe. (Nagy, p. 11) Hungarians
could do nothing but watch helplessly as their
countrymen were placed under foreign gov-
ernments and forced to live with other ethnic
groups that would have otherwise never lived
together. 
Many Hungarians felt that the Peace
Conference took advantage of Hungary’s polit-
ical and economic breakdown immediately fol-
lowing the war to safeguard the post-war inter-
ests of the Allies. The new borders, drawn on
the basis of political considerations rather than
ethnic distribution, turned the Hungarian
minority issue into a major lingering source of
resentment. The issue became a problem that
Hungary grappled with for decades to come.
World War II (1939–1945)
Paralyzed by poor economic conditions
and motivated by the desire to regain some of
its lost territory and people, Hungary cooper-
ated with the Nazi government of Germany
before and during World War II. At first,
Hungary’s decision paid off handsomely. The
First Vienna Award was signed in 1938 between
Hungary and Czechoslovakia with Italy and
Germany acting as arbiters (Wojatsek, p. 163).
Through this agreement, Hungary gained 4,600
sq. miles of southern Slovakia (Binnendijk and
Simon) that was 86.5 percent ethnically
Hungarian. (Deme) Soon after, the Second
Vienna Award, signed in 1940 between Hungary
and Romania (Kertesz), awarded northern
Transylvania to Hungary. This returned anoth-
er 16,500 sq. miles to Hungary. (Binnendijk and
Simon) Transylvania’s population was made up
of 51.4 percent ethnic Hungarians. (Deme)
However, Hungary’s border expansion was
short-lived. The defeat of the Axis powers in
World War II was followed by a new peace treaty
concluded in Paris on February 10, 1947. The
Paris Peace Treaty re-established the borders
outlined in the Trianon Treaty. Hungary was
further penalized with a hefty U.S. $300 million
indemnity, and her army was also once again
limited in size. (“Hungary”) 
For the second time in the twentieth cen-
tury, Hungary was severely punished for being
on the losing side in war. It is important to note
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that her second crushing defeat was a conse-
quence of the first. Had Hungary not received
such severe treatment in the Treaty of Trianon,
she might not have been so easily enticed into
cooperating with the Nazis in World War II.
The Condition of Hungarians in
Neighboring Countries
As Hungary’s economy worsened after
each war, so did the living conditions of her peo-
ple, especially Hungarians outside the country.
Overnight, some 3.4 million Hungarians living
in areas such as Transylvania (Romania) and
Vojvodina (Serbia) found their social status
changed from being a majority population in
Hungary into a minority group. The presence
of Hungarians in these states was also not well
received by the locals. Hungarians were con-
sidered outsiders and were often viewed as
agents of the Hungarian government. As a
result, they were ill-treated and regarded with
suspicion. 
In Romania, for example, Hungarian
minorities were given only second-class citi-
zenship status, denied of their rights to use
their mother tongue in official matters. In
January 1921, shortly after Transylvania was
handed to Romania, one of the Romanian
Ministry of Justice offices required all court cor-
respondence to be carried out only in the
Romanian language. (Biro, p. 445) Hungarian
was no longer recognized as an official lan-
guage. The banning of the Hungarian language
was just the start of many other discriminato-
ry acts against ethnic Hungarians. Under the
tyrannical leadership of President Nicolae
Ceaus,escu from 1965–89 (“Nicolae Ceaus,escu”),
the Romanian language slowly displaced the
Hungarian language in schools. In 1986 the
U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, an interna-
tional organization protecting human rights,
reported that Hungarian schools had been sys-
tematically removed. (Newall) In 1989 about
7,000 Hungarian villages were threatened with
destruction. The proposed liquidation of these
villages included plans to demolish churches
and historical monuments. (Newall)
Hungarians in Czechoslovakia faced sim-
ilar actions. The use of the Hungarian language
was banned by Slovak government. (Kardos)
The government also shut down most
Hungarian schools (Janics) and denied
Slovakian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians.
(Kardos) 
The discrimination aimed at Hungarians
in neighboring countries arose for a variety of
reasons, such as the rise of nationalistic senti-
ments in those countries and the fear that the
Hungarian minorities might destabilize local
governments. These discriminatory acts, while
clearly in violation of human rights, went unre-
solved for years during the Soviet era because
the communist countries had a tacit agreement
not to criticize each other’s policies toward
minorities. Therefore, Hungary could do very
little to protect her minorities in neighboring
countries.
Hungary under the Communist
Regime (1949–1989)
The Soviet Union was given the responsi-
bility of ensuring the implementation of the
Paris Peace Treaty signed at the end of World
War II. As a result, a large Soviet military con-
tingent remained in Hungary. Through careful
planning, the Soviets systematically removed
democratic leaders from office, gradually lead-
ing to the formation of the communist
Hungarian People’s Republic in 1949.
(Hungarian Government Portal) Under the
communist regime, most sectors were heavily
regulated, especially agriculture and education.
Peasants were forced into government cooper-
atives, and all means of communication were
severely limited. The limitations on freedom of
speech meant that Hungarians were not
allowed to try to resolve the persecution and
discriminatory acts against Hungarians in
neighboring countries. (Deme)
The stifling conditions in Hungary finally
led to a revolt in 1956. The demands made by
the revolutionaries included the right to own
and farm land, the freedom to manage their
own workplaces, and the freedom of speech.
The revolution was started by a group of stu-
dents who assembled in Budapest and were
later joined by workers and other Hungarians.
The demonstration, initially a peaceful one,
turned violent when the authorities fired the
first shots. The uprising ended tragically with
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the death of at least 20,000 Hungarian workers
and the escape of about 200,000 refugees.
(“Hungary 1956…”)
Although the revolution failed, conditions
for peasants and intellectuals slowly improved.
The Stalinist regime gradually loosened its iron
grip, giving workers’ councils more control
over factories and mines. Agricultural cooper-
atives also began to follow a more free-market
model. (“Hungary”) These changes, derided as
“goulash communism” by hard-line socialists,
eventually led to a political changeover shortly
before the imminent implosion of the USSR in
1991. In 1989 Hungary formally renounced
communism, proclaiming itself a free democ-
ratic republic under the new name, Republic of
Hungary. (“Important Dates…”) A new foreign
policy encouraging more contact with Western
Europe was adopted. Hungary’s separation from
the Soviet bloc also paved the way to greater
freedom of speech and thought. (“Hungary”)
Combined with the granting of the freedom of
the press and Hungary’s new voice in the inter-
national community, the issue of the millions
of Hungarian minorities living in neighboring
countries since 1920 resurfaced.
Nationalism
Hungarian minorities abroad became a
hot topic for debate in Hungary’s domestic and
foreign politics after 1989. The progress of this
issue from backstage to centerstage mirrored
the changing face of Hungarian nationalism. In
order to understand how this transition hap-
pened, some discussion of the evolution of
Hungarian nationalism is in order. 
Under the Austrian Habsburg rule in the
seventeenth century, Hungarian nationalism
was equated with the struggle for national sov-
ereignty and independence from Austria.
(Csepeli and Orkeny) In the aftermath of the
Trianon Treaty and the period between the wars,
nationalism took on a new meaning. Hungarian
nationalists fought for the reincorporation of
ethnic Hungarians back into Hungary. They
also demanded return of the lands that were
taken away from Hungary by the Treaty of
Trianon. This new nationalistic spirit greatly
disturbed Hungary’s neighbors, who viewed ter-
ritorial claims as a threat to their sovereignty.
(“Hungary: Nationalism”) When Hungary
became communist, these claims were tem-
porarily suppressed by the Soviets. Good rela-
tions among socialist neighbors were given
higher priority than territorial aspirations,
turning the minority issue into a taboo subject.
During the 1956 Revolution, however, the
pre-communist desire for national sovereignty
resurfaced (Iordachi), although with some
slight changes. The World War II settlements
had solidified demacartion lines, rendering
claims for border revision infeasible. Hungary’s
nationalism focused both on the protection of
Hungarian compatriots living beyond the bor-
ders and the preservation of Hungarian culture.
This new attitude became even more apparent
after Hungary renounced communism.
Hungary’s Constitution, Article 6 (3), stipulates
that “the Republic of Hungary shall have a sense
of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians liv-
ing beyond its borders and shall promote their
cultivation of ties with Hungary.”1 The new pro-
tective attitude adopted by Hungary thus went
hand in hand with the formation of the
Republic. As a new country, Hungary felt a
strong need to promote its Hungarian culture.
The Re-emergence of the Issue of
Hungarians Abroad 
With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the
Hungarian government also looked for ways to
demonstrate to the international community
that the new Hungary was ready to take on a
more significant international role. The
Hungarian minority issue became a convenient
pretext for the Hungarian government to con-
vey that message. An opportunity presented
itself in the late 1980s following a large influx
of refugees from Transylvania into Hungary.
Hungary broke the tacit agreement not to crit-
icize its neighbor’s minority policies by endors-
ing public protests against Romania, which had
planned to relocate many Hungarian commu-
nities within its borders. (Iordachi) In 1988
Hungary also co-sponsored a major human
rights proposal targeting Romania’s minority
9
1Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (as amended
by Act No XXXI of 1989). Quoted in Mullerson (p. 800). See
reference list for details.
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policies at the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. (Kardos) Hungary’s
renewed interest in the human rights issue was
the Hungarian government’s strategy to indi-
cate to the international community that the
new democratic republic was ready to take on
a more independent foreign policy than before.
The Hungarian minority issue was also
regularly debated inside Hungary. During the
first Hungarian Parliament meeting as a demo-
cratic country, Hungarian policymakers
announced that they wanted “negotiations with
the governments of the neighboring countries
to formulate bilateral treaties to protect nation-
al minorities.” (Deme) They went on to empha-
size the need to “secure for the minorities indi-
vidual and collective rights, self-government,
cultural autonomy.” (Deme) True to its words,
the Hungarian government signed a treaty with
Slovakia in March 1995 and with Romania in
September 1996. Both treaties were signed to
resolve border and minority rights disputes.
(Binnendijk and Simon) Although none of the
parties involved were entirely satisfied with the
results, the treaties helped resolve some of the
border issues between the three countries.
The Hungarian minority issue was also
addressed in public. In April 1990, only months
after Hungary became democratic, Hungary’s
first prime minister, József Antall, declared him-
self the leader of 15 million Hungarians, even
though Hungary only has 10 million inhabi-
tants. Antall’s declaration soon triggered criti-
cism from abroad. (Kardos) Although Antall
later claimed that he only regarded himself as
a “spiritual” leader of the 15 million
Hungarians, his declaration showed that
Hungarian politicians would use the sensitive
minorities issue as a means to rally domestic
support. 
Viktor Orbán, chairman of the Fidesz-
Hungarian Civic Party and Hungarian prime
minister from 1998–2002, was another politi-
cian who used the issue to his advantage. Orbán
was well known for his nationalistic ideology.
(“Hungarian PM Eyes Re-election…”) During
his term in office, he took a strong stance to
protect trans-border Hungarians as a means of
popularizing the party’s center-right ideals.
(“Hungarian Nationalism Fails…”) To demon-
strate the government’s concern for the well-
being of these Hungarian minorities, under his
administration the Hungarian parliament
passed the Status Law with an overwhelming
92.4 percent majority in 1999. (Nemes) This
new law entitled trans-border Hungarians to
special identity documents that enabled them
to temporarily seek employment, education,
and health care in Hungary. (“Country
Profile...”) This law was met with harsh criti-
cism from Hungary’s neighbors; Slovakia and
Romania, in particular, claimed that the law
encroached on their sovereignty. (“Hungarian
Nationalism Fails…”)
Nonetheless, Orbán continued to exploit
the trans-border Hungarian issue. In the 2002
election, his Fidesz Party faced serious compe-
tition from the Hungarian Socialist Party. The
Fidesz Party and the Socialist Party both had
very similar economic policies. (“Hungarian
Nationalism Fails…”) Realizing that his party
needed to differentiate itself from the Socialists
in order to gain a competitive edge, Orbán once
again tried to use the trans-border Hungarian
minorities issue to win the voters’ hearts.
Orbán’s political platform included demands for
autonomy for Hungarians in Slovakia,
Romania, Ukraine and Serbia (“Ethnic Kin
Leaders…”) as well as a review of World War II
decrees by which tens of thousands of
Hungarians were driven out of Czechoslovakia.
(“Hungarian PM…”) 
As in the case of the Status Law, Orbán’s
campaign demands were met with angry
responses from Hungary’s neighbors. But
unlike with the Status Law, however, Orbán’s
strategy backfired. The opposition party was
quick to tap into the backlash from neighbor-
ing countries to accuse the leadership of tar-
nishing Hungary’s image in the international
community. (“Hungarian PM…”) As a result,
Orbán lost the election, and in September 2002
a Socialist government, under the leadership of
Péter Medgyessy, was installed as the new
Hungarian government.
Although Viktor Orbán did not win the
election, results from the polls showed that the
Hungarians-abroad issue was a strong one. Had
Orbán succeeded, he would have been the first
post-communist leader to be re-elected. This
in itself would have great significance since 
governments in Central Europe tend to switch
parties after every election. (“Hungarian
PM…”)
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The December 5, 2004, Referendum
Just as the issue of Hungarian minorities
abroad began to calm down, however, and just
two years after the prior election, the contro-
versy was renewed by the Fidesz Party. In prepa-
ration for the upcoming election in 2006, the
party tried to rejuvenate the fading issue in
hopes of gaining more voter support. The
Fidesz Party demanded that dual citizenship
status be conferred on ethnic Hungarians
abroad, claiming that failure to do so would
show a disregard for their kin who were in dire
need of assistance.
The Fidesz Party’s claims put the incum-
bent Socialist Party in an awkward situation.
Turning a cold shoulder to the issue would
cause the Socialists to lose popularity among
the voters. On the other hand, conferring dual
citizenship could cost the government Ft 500
billion (U.S. $2.5 billion). (“Dual Citizenship
Debate…”) The stalemated Parliament decided
to turn the issue over to the public by calling
for a referendum (“The Public Will Decide”),
which was held on December 5, 2004. The ref-
erendum failed due to low turnout, with fewer
than 25 percent of eligible voters casting bal-
lots (“Socialist and Fidesz…”).
The unsuccessful referendum angered the
Hungarians abroad. There were reports that
cars with Hungarian license plates were
attacked in Serbia after the referendum failed.
In Romania, Transylvanian-Hungarian store
owners began charging higher prices to citizens
from the mother country. (“Referendum
Fallout…”) This backlash was not unexpected.
In an interview with this author, Csongor Kuti,
a Romanian-Hungarian currently studying in
Budapest, expressed his disapproval of the ref-
erendum. Kuti felt that the referendum was
more an internal political ploy rather than a
genuine effort by the Hungarian political par-
ties to protect the well-being of trans-border
Hungarians like himself. He substantiated his
claim by pointing out that Hungarian politi-
cians often mislead the public into thinking
that trans-border Hungarians are severely ill-
treated and still living in poor conditions. He
felt offended by what he called the deliberate
inaccurate portrayal of his people by the
Hungarian government. Hungarian politicians
do not convey the much-improved social and
economic conditions of these Hungarian
minorities in order to keep the issue alive. Kuti
concluded that as long as the trans-border
Hungarians issue remains a hot topic, politi-
cians will continue to exploit it to garner votes.
Csongor Kuti’s opinion toward the refer-
endum is certainly not a rare one. On the con-
trary, the Hungarian News Agency echoed his
sentiments by calling the referendum a “popu-
larity contest” between the prime minister and
Viktor Orbán. (“Ethnic Kin…”) In a Hungarian
daily, Magyar Hírlap, an anonymous Serbian-
Hungarian expressed the same disgust for the
referendum. (“Referendum Fallout…”) He felt
that the dispute was not really about the
minorities, but rather about the goals of the two
opposing Hungarian political parties. The fact
that the Hungarian minorities were not con-
sulted regarding the referendum substantiated
his claims. Like Kuti, the Serbian-Hungarian
was also offended that Hungarian politicians
portrayed the Hungarian minorities as poor
people. His sentiments were supported by
István Tokár, president of a Romanian county,
who was quoted as saying that Romanian-
Hungarians had given up hope of receiving aid
from their ethnic brothers. (“Referendum
Fallout…”) Similar negative sentiments were
shared in Slovakia. Miklós Duray, Executive
President of the Hungarian Coalition Party in
Slovakia, expressed his disappointment over the
referendum, adding that the referendum should
not have been called in the first place.
(“Separating the ‘Szar’…”) In short, Hungarian
minorities abroad supported dual citizenship
due to sociological, not economic reasons,
because they are no longer in need of econom-
ic aid.
Meanwhile, more mixed sentiments were
seen in Hungary, where the contrasting reac-
tions were fueled by the two opposing political
parties. Supporters of dual citizenship claimed
that the granting of Hungarian citizenship
would compensate for injustices towards the
Hungarian minorities in the past. (“Dual
Citizenship Debate…”) On the other hand, a
failure to grant dual citizenship would imply an
acceptance of the injustices of the Trianon
Treaty. On a more practical note, the conferring
of dual citizenship would facilitate trans-bor-
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der visits between ethnic Hungarians. And it
was thought by some that the potential for
increased emigration would help compensate
for the aging of Hungary’s population. (“A
Political Stunt…”)
For their part, opponents of the referen-
dum pointed out that, while emigration might
help Hungary, it would deliver a death-blow to
small Hungarian communities abroad, partic-
ularly in Serbia. (Kardos) Additionally, the con-
ferring of citizenship to Hungarian minorities
abroad, as proposed in the referendum, would
place heavy financial burdens on the state bud-
get. In fact, the Socialist government worried
that the “new” Hungarian voters would desta-
bilize the political situation in Hungary by
throwing their support to the other party. (“A
Political Stunt…”)
Ironically, instead of putting to rest the
issue of Hungarian minorities abroad, the ref-
erendum breathed new life into it. When the
government called for a referendum, it did not
expect a negative reaction from Hungarians
abroad. The unanticipated backlash from these
trans-border Hungarians landed the Fidesz
Party and the Socialist Party in a permanent
deadlock.
Let Sleeping Dogs Lie
Since the collapse of communism, the
Hungarian-minority-abroad issue has become
a recurring political football. Although the 
failure of the Fidesz Party in the 2002 election
and the failed referendum indicated that
Hungarians are no longer as concerned about
their ethnic kin abroad, this issue has not faded
into the background for several reasons. First,
the newly-found freedom of speech after the
Soviet days has permitted the issue to resurface,
making it possible to raise it in each election
campaign. Second, the Fidesz Party has opted
to continue using this issue as a campaign tool.
In November and December of 2004, represen-
tatives of the Fidesz Party visited 13 major cities
as part of their awareness campaign to convince
Hungarians to vote “yes” in the referendum.
(“Fidesz Starts…”) Finally, the current Socialist
government, although not as nationalistic in its
political agenda as the Fidesz Party, feels the
need to address the Hungarian trans-border
issue due to pressures from Hungarian organi-
zations abroad. For example, in August 2004
the chairman of the Hungarian Democratic
Party of Vovjodina, Andras Agoston, demanded
a clearer policy from Hungary regarding the
protection of Hungarian minorities abroad. As
a result, the Hungarian government feels oblig-
ated to address the trans-border Hungarian
issue periodically in order to pacify the leaders
of the Hungarian minority associations in
neighboring countries and to prevent criticism
that the Hungarian government has neglected
compatriots abroad. In response to external
pressures, the government has also changed its
foreign policy with regards to the protection of
Hungarian minorities. (“Hungarians of
Vojvodina…”) Rather than trying to repatriate
ethnic Hungarians abroad back to Hungary, the
Hungarian government has chosen instead to
ensure that ethnic Hungarians abroad are well
taken care of in their host countries. (“Dual
Citizenship Debate…”)
A Way Out via the EU?
In line with Hungary’s new foreign policy,
the Hungarian government has supported proj-
ects cultivating Hungarian culture in neigh-
boring countries and has subsidized projects
encouraging the use of the Hungarian language
beyond the borders of Hungary. (“The Public
Will Decide”) Through these efforts, the
Hungarian government hopes that helping to
promote stability in its neighborhood will guar-
antee the welfare of the Hungarian minorities
in those areas. (Jeszenszky)
The Hungarian government has also
renewed its commitment to the EU’s enlarge-
ment process, recognizing that border issues
will naturally dissolve if its immediate neigh-
bors gain access to the EU. (“Socialists and
Fidesz…”) Furthermore, the establishment of
the Copenhagen criteria2 will ensure the pro-
tection of Hungarian minorities among EU
members. Hungary’s dependence on an inter-
2The Copenhagen criteria, established by the European
Council meeting in 1993, determine a country’s eligibility
to join the EU. The criteria include preservation of democ-
ratic governance and protection of human and minority
rights.
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national body to resolve border and Hungarian
minority issues has been proven to be a suc-
cessful strategy. In the mid-’90s, Hungary’s
bilateral treaties with Slovakia and Romania
were signed under the pressure of NATO; none
of the three countries (Hungary, Slovakia and
Romania) was permitted to join NATO until
they resolved their ethnic issues. (Binnendijk
and Simon)
However, the “EU solution” will not offer
an immediate resolution of the problem
because not all of Hungary’s neighbors will be
joining the EU in the near future. With that in
mind, in January 2005 the current Hungarian
Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, proposed a
five-point plan to help ethnic Hungarians
abroad. (“Five Point Ethnic Plan”) The five pro-
posals are:
(i) issuance of multiple-entry visas to
cultivate Hungarian culture, language
and national identity;
(ii) simplification of immigration proce-
dures;
(iii) continued support for autonomy in
former Hungarian territories;
(iv) economic assistance to former
Hungarian territories through a new
Ft 1 billion (U.S. $4 million) budget;
(v) issuance of EU-conforming passports
to ethnic Hungarians. 
In addition to the five-point plan, the govern-
ment has also considered drafting a law on dual
citizenship to end the stalemate. 
Although Gyurcsány’s proposal would give
clear benefits to the Hungarian minorities, his
five-point plan was heavily criticized by the
minority leaders because they were not con-
sulted. (“Five Point Ethnic Plan”) It was a new
proposal made by the new Socialist Party
President, Lázló Sólyom, in August 2005 that
pacified the politicians. In his first public
appearance, Sólyom hinted at “new legal dis-
coveries” which would grant ethnic Hungarians
in neighboring countries limited travel rights
within the European Union. (“Music…”)
Although similar proposals had been made in
the past, they conflicted with the European
Union’s Schengen Agreement.3 (“Five Point
Ethnic Plan”) Sólyom’s speech hit home
because the government had identified an
Albanian-Greek travel document, approved
under Schengen, that appeared to set a prece-
dent that would enable Hungary to accomplish
the objective while still conforming with exist-
ing Schengen laws. (“Limited EU Travel
Rights?”) This increased the practicality and
likelihood of implementing Sólyom’s proposal
to grant ethnic Hungarians travel rights with-
in the EU, thus winning the support of differ-
ent political parties.
Other governments have followed
Hungary in trying to resolve the minority issue.
In February 2005, the Serbian government
decided to grant honorary Serbian citizenship
to any ethnic Hungarians occupying areas that
had belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Unlike Hungarian citizenship, the conferral of
the honorary citizenship “symbolizes national
cohesion and entails no advantages.”
(“Hungarian City…”)
Conclusion
Hungary’s frontiers were formed approxi-
mately a thousand years ago following the
arrival of the Magyars in the Carpathian
Mountains. (“Hungary”) Prior to the collapse of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, these borders
showed remarkable stability, with an uninter-
rupted history dating back to settlement by the
Magyars. (Seton-Watson, p. 485) The dissolu-
tion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, followed
closely by the Treaty of Trianon, shut millions
of Hungarians out of Hungary. The Trianon pro-
vision gave birth to the Hungarian minority
issue, a serious problem of national identity that
Hungary has had to grapple with for many
decades.
Hungary’s accession to the European
Union seems to offer a promising solution to
the perennial minority issue. Hungary hopes
that as more and more of its neighbors join the
EU, border issues will diminish in importance
and with them the minority issue as well.
Indeed, Hungary seems to be on the right path
towards finding a solution to the problem.
Three of Hungary’s seven neighbors (Austria,
Slovenia and Slovakia) are already part of the
3The Schengen Agreement allows residents within one
participating country to move to another without having to
show their passports or being checked in any other way.
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European Union, while two others (Croatia and
Romania) have begun accession talks. (Europa)
The two remaining neighbors, Ukraine and
Serbia, although showing no signs of accession
in the near term, are cooperative neighbors.
In the long run, Hungary’s adoption of a
new foreign policy as the EU spokesperson in
Eastern Europe and its positive diplomatic
efforts in the Balkans will work in the country’s
favor. As more and more of Hungary’s neigh-
bors join the EU and Hungarian communities
abroad continue to prosper, the Hungarian
minority issue will gradually subside. Hungary’s
role as a friendly neighbor, its ongoing trade
expansion, and its cooperation with both its EU
and non-EU neighbors will lead to less suspi-
cion of Hungarian minorities in those coun-
tries. This will ensure better treatment of the
Hungarian minorities and create greater oppor-
tunities for them to participate in national
development.
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